Abstract. Pocklington certificates are known to provide short proofs of primality. We show how to perform this in the framework of formal, mechanically checked, proofs. We present an encoding of certificates for the proof system Coq which yields radically improved performances by relying heavily on computations inside and outside of the system (twolevel approach).
ancestor of today's systems, including Coq. The main motivation for all these systems, apart from the satisfaction of bringing mathematical objects "into life", is that the non-imaginative mechanical verification of a proof rules out the possibility of errors to a much higher degree than the relying on human understanding.
The arrival of proof systems triggered a new interest in the study of formalisms which were, from then on, judged by their facility of use. Indeed, when one tries to actually build a formal proof in practice, some issues become much more important than when one simply tries to persuade an intelligent reader of the existence of such a proof in principle. For example, an issue like the size of the formal proof can become crucial.
The Question of Computations
In this particular respect, the subject of computations inside proofs deserves particular attention. In traditional formalisms, deduction steps are the only valid way to build a proof. In some cases however, one wishes to also proceed by calculation steps. For instance when "proving" that 2 + 2 is equal to 4.
Typically, addition will be characterized by axioms of lemmas stating that 0+n = n and (n +1)+m = 1+(n + m). Even if we omit the steps corresponding to the properties of equality, the proof of 2 + 2 = 4 will look like 4 = 4 0 + 4 = 4 1 + 3 = 4 2 + 2 = 4
Of course, this approach leads to unreasonably large proofs if one deals with larger numbers. This issue is particularly acute when dealing with concepts that are highly computational in nature like primality. Since 1951, the largest numbers established as being prime have been so with the use of computer calculations. Of course, this fact is widely accepted. The largest number having been proved prime "by hand" by Ferrier is (2 148 + 1)/17. In other words, if one wants to prove, formally or not, the primality of a number which is not ridiculously small by today standards, one has to somehow incorporate computations into the proof.
Even if it seems clear that proof systems cannot reach the same performances as state-of-the-art dedicated software, one should hope that modern proof systems should be able to go further than what humans could do in 1951. The most natural way to go is to include computations into proofs. Fortunately, modern logical formalisms are often well-equipped for that purpose.
Conversion Rule
The logical formalisms underlying systems like NuPRL, Agda, Alf, Lego, PVS or Coq have an important feature in common. First, the language of objects of these formalisms includes a programming language. In general, this language can be described as the functional core of ML, with some restrictions to ensure termination. In Coq, as in most flavors of type theory, the fact that under assumptions Γ , the object p is a valid proof of proposition P is stated by the sequent Γ p : P . Programs, like the addition function, being part of the language, may appear in P , as they do in proposition 2 + 2 = 4. These programs bear a notion of evaluation which corresponds to small-step operational semantics. One writes = c for the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of this relation, which extends to propositions by straightforward congruence.
The fact that programs have a first-class status in these formalisms appears in the logical conversion rule, which, in Coq, reads:
which states that congruent propositions are identified up to the point that they enjoy the same proof-objects. A crucial point is that the calculation steps to go from A to B are not book-kept in the proof object p, as they would be in traditional proofs in, say, first-order logic. This means that lengthy or complex computations may result in proofs that take time to check but remain of manageable size. The idea of computational proofs is thus to exploit this feature by exchanging deduction against computation, aiming at proof objects as small as possible.
As an example, in the case of primality, a very simplified version of computational proofs would be to construct the function which tries to divide a natural number n by all numbers between 2 and n − 1. If nat is the type of natural numbers, we have test : nat → bool.
It is then easy to prove the following correctness "theorem":
Since test(1789) evaluates to true, the proposition test(1789) = true is proved using the conversion rule and the canonical proof that true = true. A simple combination with the theorem above yields the proof of prime(1789).
We can see that through this theorem, we obtain very small primality proofs for any prime number. Of course, these small proofs are uncheckable for large numbers because of the naive algorithm: test(n) needs too much time to evaluate if n is large. However, following the same idea, we can now build on the tremendous effort made to provide efficient primality checks and import this technology into type theory. Schematically, we only have to provide a cleverer (i.e. faster) version of test.
Safe Computations vs. Fast Computations
The programming language embedded in type theory bears some restrictions since it is primarily meant to be the base of a well-understood logical formalism. As such, it discards imperative features like mutable variables or arrays. Having to check primality of large numbers with a form of "toy programming language" may look like arbitrary self-restraint. On the other hand, there is a line to draw to decide what computations are safe enough to be considered part of the proof, and which ones lie outside the formal system.
Things are not too bad yet, since the recent versions of Coq benefit from a much faster execution mechanism which uses technology from the programming language world: programs are compiled on-the-fly to a state-of-the-art byte-code. This way to proceed can, we hope, be considered to be a reasonable trade-off between efficiency and safety. With respect to previous execution mechanism using interpreters, one can observe a gain in speed by a factor of 40 and when we write these lines, Coq can probably execute programs much faster than most other comparable proof-systems. Indeed, this work arose largely as an attempt to explore the new possibilities opened by this fast computations in proofs.
Autarkic Computation vs. Certificates
Once one accepts the dichotomy between fast but unsafe computations outside of the proof-checker and slower computations which are part of the proof-checking process, one has to choose between two possibilities. A first one is to perform all computations inside the system, in an autarkic way [3] ; this is what happens with the trivial algorithm mentioned above. Another one, is to remark it is easier to find a way out of a labyrinth, when some outside source provides one with an Ariadne's thread (a red line) leading to the exit. In other words, a possibility is to perform some computations outside the system by some dedicated software and then pass-on a trace (the red line) of this computation to the proof-checker. This trace gives some information on how computations should be performed and is thus a part of the resulting proof-object. This approach is called skeptical computations by Barendregt and was pioneered by Harrison and Théry [8] , although in a very different context. This work is typical for the skeptical computational approach. The idea of building a proof using a Pocklington certificate computed by outside means was first used by Caprotti and Oostdijk [6] whose work was the starting base for our effort.
Pocklington Certificates

The Theorem
Pocklington's theorem [10] dates back to 1914 and provides a sufficient condition for primality of natural numbers: Theorem 1. Given a natural numbers n > 1 and a witness a and some pairs
, it is sufficient for n to be prime that the following conditions hold:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} gcd(a
It is worth mentioning, that there is no precisely stated theorem in Pocklington's work. Therefore, the literature often mentions slightly less powerful variants of the previous statement under the same denomination. There are three simple but central observations to make:
-The first one is that, given n, it requires much more computation power to determine suitable numbers a, p 1 , α 1 , . . . , q k , α k than to check that these numbers verify the conditions 1-4 above. Thus, one says that a, p 1 , α 1 . . . , p k , α k form a Pocklington certificate. Caprotti and Oostdijk rightly concluded that this was a typical case for the skeptical approach: the certificate is constructed by some outside software and only its verification is done inside the proof system. -The second observation is that for a natural number n, provided we are given p 1 , . . . , p k and a, checking primality of n boils down to: 1. verification of conditions 1-4 which are purely done by numerical computations, 2. verification of condition 0 which can be done recursively.
-The last observation is that Theorem 1 is the only theorem that needs to be formalized in the prover to insure the correctness of the verification of the certificate, but we also use implicitly its converse: if a number n is prime it is always possible to find a certificate. Given a sufficiently large partial decomposition of n − 1, a generator of the multiplicative group Z/nZ is a valid candidate for a. Such a generator exists because n is prime so Z/nZ is cyclic.
Theorem 1 was the one used by Caprotti and Oostdijk in their experiment described in [6] . Condition 4 indicates that in order to generate a certificate one needs to be able to partially factorize n − 1 at least till its square root. For our experiment we are using an improved version proposed by Brillhart, Lehmer and Selfridge in [4] . With this new version, we only need to partially factorize till the cube root. As factorizing n−1 is the time-consuming part of finding a certificate, this is a considerable improvement. The theorem that we have formalized in Coq is the following:
Theorem 2. Given a number n, a witness a and some pairs
where all the p i are prime numbers, let
it is sufficient for n to be prime that the following conditions hold:
The remarks we made about Theorem 1 remain valid for Theorem 2. The existence of a certificate is not direct from Theorem 2 but derives from the exact theorem given in [4] which is a stronger statement: If conditions 5-8 hold then n is prime iff condition 9 holds.
The Certificates
A 
-a pair (n, ψ) composed by a number n and a proof ψ that this number is prime.
The second case is added in order to allow primality proofs which do not rely on Pocklington's theorem. This is useful for 2 (which cannot be proved prime using Pocklington's theorem) but also for using other methods which may be more efficient than Pocklington for some numbers. Using this representation, a possible certificate 2 for 127 is:
where prime2 is a proof that 2 is prime. One can remark that this kind of representation duplicates some certificates (here 3 and 2). So, the verification routine will verify many times these certificates. It order to share certificates, we drop trees by flattening them to lists. In this case this yields:
We have replaced recursive certificates by their corresponding prime number in decompositions. These certificates appear in the tail of the list. Note that doing so, the certificates for 2 and 3 now appear only once.
This translates straightforwardly into the following Coq definitions:
Definition dec_prime := list (positive*positive).
Inductive pre_certif : Set := | Pock_certif : forall n a : positive, dec_prime -> pre_certif | Proof_certif : forall n : positive, prime n -> pre_certif.
Definition certificate := list pre_certif.
First, we introduce the notion of partial factorization which is a list of prime numbers and their exponent (dec prime). Second, we define the notion of precertificates which are either a pair of a prime number n and its primality proof (Proof certif), or a tuple of a prime number n, a witness a and a list of numbers representing a partial factorization of the predecessor of n (Pock certif). This case is not self contained, since it does not contain the primality proofs of the numbers in the partial factorization. This is why we call it pre-certificate.
A complete certificate is a list of pre-certificates. The head of the list is generally a triple (Pock certif n a d), the tail contains pre-certificates for numbers appearing in the factorization list d of the first one (and recursively).
Checking Certificates
Since this last definition is basically a free structure, the existence of an object of type certificate does not yet allow to state anything about primality. We focus on the function C which verifies the validity of a certificate and on the correctness proof of this function.
Our goal is to define C as a function from certificates to boolean, returning true if the list implies the primality of the numbers it contains. Remark that, for our purpose, the completeness of the function C is not required; the correctness lemma we want to prove is:
where (n c) is the prime number contained in the pre-certificate c. In fact, we prove a more general lemma:
The function C is defined recursively over the list l. If the list l is empty, the function returns true. If the list is not empty (l = c :: l ), the function performs a recursive call over l , this implies the validity of all the pre-certificates in l and so the primality of their associated numbers. Then the function verifies the validity of the pre-certificate c, there are two cases:
-If c is given by its proof form c = (n, ψ), in that case there is nothing to do (the type checking of Coq ensures that ψ is a valid primality proof for n).
The function first verifies that all the divisors p 1 , . . . , p k have a corresponding pre-certificate in the list l (this implies that all the divisors are prime). If this is the case, the function checks that the pre-certificate verifies conditions 5-9; this is done by another function C c .
Checking the Computational Conditions
The function C c starts by computing the numbers F 1 , R 1 , s, r as defined in theorem 2. Verifying conditions 5 and 6 is then straightforward. For conditions 7 and 8 the difficulty is to efficiently compute a n−1 mod n and gcd(a n−1
It is important not to compute a n−1 and a n−1 p i , which can be huge. We do this by always working modulo n since gcd(b, n) = gcd(b mod n, n). Furthermore, we can compute only one gcd using the fact that gcd(
We define the following functions working modulo n: -a predecessor function (Npred mod); -a multiplication function (times mod); -a power function (Npow mod) (using the repeated square-and-multiply algorithm); -a multi-power function (fold pow mod) that given a, l = [q 1 ; . . . ; q r ] and n computes a q1...qr mod n.
Another optimization is to share parts of the computations of a n−1 p 1 mod n, . . . , a n−1 p k mod n, a n−1 mod n.
Let m = (n−1)/(p 1 . . .p k ), if we perform these computations separately, a m mod n is computed k + 1 times, (a m mod n) p1 mod n is computed k times, and so on. To share computation we define the following function: Remark that the application of this function to P = 1, A = a m mod n and l = [p 1 ; . . . ; p k ] leads to the numbers we need to compute. Note that the order of the list l is important for efficiency. A p1 is computed only once, but power of elements in the tail of the list are computed more than once. So, the function is more efficient if l in sorted in decreasing order.
Finally, the function C c checks the condition 9 (s = 0∨r 2 −8s is not a square). If s = 0 and r 2 − 8s ≥ 0 it should check that r 2 − 8s is not a square. To do so, we slightly adapt the definition of pre-certificates by adding the low integer square root 3 sqrt, and we only verify that
To sum up the extended inductive type for pre-certificate is
Inductive pre_certif : Set := | Pock_certif : forall n a sqrt: positive, dec_prime -> pre_certif | Proof_certif : forall n : positive, prime n -> pre_certif.
Defining Arithmetic Operations in Coq
The programming language of Coq is functional. Datatypes can be defined using inductive types. One can then write recursive functions over datatypes using structural recursion only. This restriction and the type system ensure the strong normalization of the language from which the logical soundness of the system is derived. When doing computational proofs, each time we define a function we also need to prove formally its correctness. This means that most of the time we have to do a compromise between the efficiency of the function, the difficulty of writing it in a structural recursive functional language and the cost of proving its correctness. xH represents 1, xO x represents 2x, xI x represents 2x+1. So 6 is represented by (xO (xI xH)). All the operations are purely functional (i.e. no machine arithmetic and no side effect). This means that every time an operation returns a number, this number has to be allocated. In our application, allocating and garbage collecting are particularly time consuming.
To minimize allocation we had to re-implement some operations. For example, in the standard library the remainder function is defined as the second component of the euclidean division. This means that computing a remainder also allocates for the quotient. We provide a more direct implementation. Also we have implemented a special function for squaring numbers.
Building Certificates
The goal of this section is to explain how to build certificates for large prime numbers. The main difficulty is to compute a partial factorization of the predecessor of the prime n we want to prove.
As said above, this factorization is naturally done relying on tools outside of the proof system. The software building the certificate thus plays the role of an oracle whose prediction is however carefully verified. We built this software as a C program based on the ECM library [1] and the GMP library [2] . Given a number n, the program generates Coq files whose lemmas have the following form:
Lemma prime_n : prime n. Proof. apply (Pock_refl (Pock_certif n a d sqrt) l). exact_no_check (refl_equal true). Qed.
where a is the witness of the Pocklington theorem, d a partial factorization of n−1, sqrt the square root of r 2 −8s (if r 2 −8s is positive otherwise 1) and l is the list of pre-certificates proving that all numbers in the factorization are prime. The proof starts by an application of the reflexive theorem Pock refl. At proofchecking time, the system checks that C((n, a, d, sqrt) :: l) = true or, to be more precise, that this proposition is convertible with the proposition true = true. Indeed, refl equal true simply stands for the canonical proof of true = true. This last step is really the reflexive part of the proof, where deduction is replaced by computation. As we can see, the computation step does not appear in the proof which allows to build very small proofs. In our case, the size of the proof is mainly the size of the certificate (n, a, d, sqrt) :: l.
A technical detail for Coq users: during the construction of the proof, we ask the system not yet to check that C((n, a, d, sqrt) :: l) = true is convertible with true = true. This is done only once at the validation step (Qed). The ability of the proof checker to compute C((n, a, d, sqrt) :: l) is crucial, for the verification time.
Generating Certificates for Arbitrary Numbers
The difficult task for the oracle is to obtain the partial factorization and to find the witness. The basic options of the oracle are the following:
pocklington is the oracle that generates a certificate for the prime number prime or the next prime number following the number num. The -v option is for verbose mode, -o allows to chose the name of the output file, if none is given a default name is created depending of the prime number.
The oracle first checks that the number n has a large probability to be prime, and then tries to find a pseudo decomposition of its predecessor. To compute this decomposition it first tries to get all the small factors of n using trivial divisions by 2, 3, 5 and 7 and then by all the numbers greater than 7 that are not a multiples of 2, 3, 5 and 7. The division limit is the maximum of one million and log 2 (n) 2 . Then, if the pseudo decomposition obtained so far is still less than the cubic root of n, the oracle tries to find larger factors using the ECM library.
The ECM library proposes three methods to find factors: (p-1, p+1 and ecm). We have developed a simple heuristic that successively calls the three methods to find, first, factors of less that 20 digits, then, less that 25 digits and so on up to factors less than 65 digits. This process is not deterministic and not exhaustive. The iteration terminates as soon as we get a sufficiently large partial decomposition. So, we can miss some factors and we are not sure that the process terminates in a reasonable time.
When a partial decomposition has been found, the oracle tries to find the witness a for the Pocklington criteria by testing 2, 3, 4 and so on. Finally it calls itself recursively on the numbers in the decomposition for which no certificate has yet been generated.
In order to share computations, the certificates for the first 5000 primes (form 2 to 48611) are provided at the start in a separated file BasePrimes.v. Thus certificates for prime numbers less than 48611 are not regenerated.
Using this technique, the oracle is able to generate certificates for most of the prime numbers containing less that 100 digits (in base 10), and for some larger primes. The first striking remark is that such a number is written 1111 . . . 1111 in base 2. The second is that the decomposition of its predecessor always contains 2, since (2 n − 1) − 1 = 2(2 n−1 − 1). So, finding a decomposition of its predecessor is equivalent to finding a decomposition of 2 n−1 − 1. Here we can use some very simple arithmetical properties to start the decomposition:
Generating Certificates for Mersenne Numbers
The oracle uses those tricks recursively to start the decomposition of the predecessor of Mersenne number, this allows to considerably reduce the size of the numbers to factorize. Since 2 n − 1 can be prime only if n is odd, we know n − 1 is even and the first remark always applies. When we reach the point where these two remarks do not apply any more, the oracle uses the method for arbitrary numbers to factorize the resulting numbers as described above.
The syntax to compute the certificate for the Mersenne number 2 n − 1 is the following: pocklington -mersenne n. This technique allows to build certificates for the 15 firsts Mersenne numbers, the largest one is for n = 1279 and has 386 digits.
When n grows further the resulting numbers are too big for their factorizations to be computed. So we have added a new entry to the oracle that takes as argument a file containing a prime number and a partial decomposition of its predecessor. The syntax is the following: pocklington -dec file.
We can use the trick described below and the tables [5] to build the file. These tables contain most of the factorizations of b n ± 1 for b = 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and n a high power (for b = 2, n should be less than 1200). Those tables are available directly on the Web 4 . Using these techniques we have been able to compute a certificate for 16th (n = 2203) and the 17th (n = 2281) Mersenne numbers.
Going to the Limit
Some similar problems appears for the 18th Mersenne number (n = 3217): using the table we are able to compute the complete factorization of
but we are not able to find a certificate for one of the prime divisors, which is a number of only 90 digits. To solve this, our idea is to find some prime divisors of 2 1608 + 1 big enough to replace the prime divisor of 90 digits in the pseudo decomposition. The problem is that 2 1608 + 1 is not in the table. To factorize 2 1608 + 1 we used a well known property of cyclotomic polynomial 5 :
where Φ d (x) is the cyclotomic polynomial, given by:
where µ is the Möbius function [9] . Setting 2n = 2 t m with m odd, leads to:
where all the Φ 2 t d (x) are divisors of x n + 1 that we can factorize. Using this trick we have been able to compute enough prime divisors of 2 1608 + 1 to replace the 90 digits prime divisors of 2 1608 − 1, and to build certificates for all its prime divisors. Finally this allowed us to build a certificate for the 18th Mersenne number which yields 969 digits. This number was first proved prime by Riesel in 1957. Note that Pocklington certificate is known not to be the most efficient way to verify the primality of Mersenne numbers. Lucas test gives a much simpler criterion since it does not require any factorization: We have also formalized this theorem in our prover to compare the running time of this test with our generated Pocklington certificates for Mersenne numbers.
To do so we add a new entry Lucas certif in our inductive type:
Inductive pre_certif : Set := | Pock_certif : forall n a : positive, dec_prime -> pre_certif | Proof_certif : forall n : positive, prime n -> pre_certif | Lucas_certif : forall n p : positive, pre_certif.
where n should be 2 p − 1. To generate certificates for Mersenne numbers using Lucas test, we add a new entry to the oracle: pocklington -lucas p.
Generating Certificate for Proth Numbers
A more friendly set of prime numbers for Pocklington certificate are the Proth numbers. They are numbers of form k2 p + 1, where k is odd. Providing that k is sufficiently small with respect to 2 p , the partial decomposition reduces to 2 p . So the generation of the corresponding certificate is trivial. To generate Pocklington certificates for Proth number we add a new entry to the oracle: pocklington -proth k p.
Performances
All the certificates described in the section above have been checked in Coq. The software and formal material are available at the following location:
http://www-sop.inria.fr/everest/Benjamin.Gregoire/primnumber.html
Certificates are generated by the pocklington program that is composed of 1721 lines of C code. They are then checked in Coq using our library that consists of 6653 lines of proof script. We provide some performance figures for the cvs version 8.0 of Coq with processor Intel Pentium 4 (3.60 GHz) and a RAM of 1Gb. Of course, this version of Coq uses the compilation scheme described in [7] . Figure 1 gives the time to build the certificates for the 100000 first primes, the size of the certificate and the time for the Coq system to check them. On average, generating certificates for a small prime number takes about 3.10 −5 seconds, their sizes are 215 bytes average, and it takes about 0.0144 seconds to verify. Figure 2 makes a comparison between the deductive approach (the one developed by Oostdijk and Caprotti) and our reflexive one, using curious primes. The 44 digits prime number (2 148 + 1)/17 is the biggest one proved in Coq before our work.
As expected, the reflexive method considerably reduces the size of the proof, as showed by the size column of the table. For the prime number (2 148 + 1)/17, the size is reduced by a factor 1500. The reduction of the proof size is natural since explicit deduction is replaced by implicit computation.
The three last columns compare the verification time for the different approaches. Without the use of the virtual machine, the reflexive approach is a little bit faster, but the times are comparable. If we verify the proof with the version of Coq using a virtual machine to perform the conversion test (here to compute the result of the C function), we can observe a gain of a factor 9 for small examples to more than 120 for the biggest ones. This means that the combination of computational reflexion with the virtual machine allows small proofs that are quickly verified.
Note that when verifying a reflexive proof the time consuming task is the reduction of decision procedure. It is precisely the reduction that the virtual machine improves. This explains why we get such a speed up. Using virtual machine for checking deductive proofs usually does not provide any speed up since these proofs do not use much reduction.
Using the reflexive approach, we have been able to prove a new random prime number of 200 digits:
in 191 seconds and the proof size is 2K. In practice, it is difficult to find factors of more than 35 digits. Most numbers with less than 100 digits contain sufficient factors of less than 20 digits, so ECM finds them rapidly. For larger numbers, being able to generate a certificate for N is a question of luck, N − 1 must be smooth (i.e. it contains a lot of small factors). This is the case for P 200 . Figure 3 gives the time to verify the certificates of the 18th first Mersenne numbers (using a Pocklington certificate), except for the 7th first which are part of the first 100000 primes. The biggest one is a 969 digit number. We have not been able to generate certificates for numbers greater than the 18th. For the 19th Mersenne number, we have not been able to find a sufficiently large partial factorization of its predecessor. For the 20th, we have such a factorization (using the table of aurifeuillian polynomial from [5] ), but we are not able to recursively generate the certificates for two of its factors.
For Mersenne numbers, we can do better than using a Pocklington certificate using Lucas test. The last column gives the time to verify in Coq the 20 first Mersenne number using this test. As far as we know, the 20th Mersenne number is the biggest prime number that has been formally proved in a proof assistant.
For all these benchmarks, we have to keep in mind that Coq uses its own arithmetic: numbers are encoding by a inductive type, i.e. a chained list of booleans. No native machine arithmetic is used. This means that the computations which are done to check certificates are more similar to symbolic computation than to numerical computation. For example, when dealing with the 20th Mersenne number, a 4422 digits number in base 2 (1332 in base 10), we manipulate list of 4423 elements. The fact that we are capable to perform such a symbolic computation clearly indicates that the introduction of the virtual machine in Coq is an effective gain in computing power.
Conclusion
Proofs are what ensures the correctness of computations, but many results of mathematics or computer science can only be established through computations. It does even seem likely that the proportion of computationally obtained results will grow in the future. But the more intricated computation and deduction become, the more difficult it is to have a global overview of the resulting construction; this raises a serious question regarding the reliability of the final statement. This issue is important, especially when considering that important mathematical results now rely, at least partly, on computations. Famous examples are the four color theorem or the Kepler conjecture.
The ultimate goal of works as the present one is to establish proof systems as the place where proofs and computations interleave in a fruitful and yet safe way. In the case of Coq, recent progress in the implementation of reduction was a significant step in reducing the overhead for doing computations inside the proof system rather than outside. Even if progress should still be made in that respect, it appears that what we have been able to prove, for typically computational statements, is not ridiculous and represents a step in the right direction.
In order to go further on the topic of formal primality proofs, two ways should obviously be explored. A first one is to formalize more modern primality proofs, as the ones relying on algebraic curves. This means translating to Coq an interesting body of mathematics. A second direction is to pursue the work on the system itself. Indeed, a current mechanical bottleneck is certainly the very inefficient representation of numbers in the proof system (basically as lists of bits). Integrating numbers into type theory with a more primitive status, allowing operations which could be implemented using more low-level features of the processor and doing this in a safe way is an interesting challenge and would be a further step in the quest of computationally efficient proof systems. Once this done, we can hope for a powerful system for combining deduction, symbolic computation and numerical computation in a safe and integrated way.
